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Abstract
Machine learning applications often require cal-
ibrated predictions, e.g. a 90% credible inter-
val should contain the true outcome 90% of the
times. However, typical definitions of calibration
only require this to hold on average, and offer
no guarantees on predictions made on individ-
ual samples. Thus, predictions can be system-
atically over or under confident on certain sub-
groups, leading to issues of fairness and potential
vulnerabilities.
We show that calibration for individual samples
is possible in the regression setup if the predic-
tions are randomized, i.e. outputting randomized
credible intervals. Randomization removes sys-
tematic bias by trading off bias with variance. We
design a training objective to enforce individual
calibration and use it to train randomized regres-
sion functions. The resulting models are more
calibrated for arbitrarily chosen subgroups of the
data, and can achieve higher utility in decision
making against adversaries that exploit miscali-
brated predictions.
1. Introduction
Many applications of machine learning, such as safety-
critical systems and medical diagnosis, require accurate
estimation of the uncertainty associated with each predic-
tion. Uncertainty is typically represented using a proba-
bility distribution on the possible outcomes. To reflect the
underlying uncertainty, these probabilities should be cali-
brated (Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi, 2006; Vovk et al., 2005;
Guo et al., 2017). In the regression setup, for example, the
true outcome should be below the predicted 50% quantile
(median) roughly 50% of the times (Kuleshov et al., 2018).
However, even when the probability forecaster is cali-
brated, it is possible that the true outcome is always below
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the predicted median on a subgroup (e.g., men), and always
above the predicted median for another (e.g., women). In
other words, the standard notion of calibration is a prop-
erty that needs to hold only on average across all predic-
tions made (i.e., on the set of all input data points). The
predicted probabilities can still be highly inaccurate for in-
dividual data samples. These predictions can lead to un-
fair or otherwise suboptimal decisions. For example, a
bank might over-predict credit risk for one gender group
and unfairly deny loans, or under-predict credit risk for a
group that can then exploit this mistake to their advantage.
Group calibration (Kleinberg et al., 2016) partly addresses
the short-comings of average calibration by requiring cali-
bration on pre-specified groups (e.g. men and women). In
particular, (Hébert-Johnson et al., 2017) achieves calibra-
tion on any group that can be computed from input by a
small circuit. However, these methods are not applicable
when the groups are unknown or difficult to compute from
the input. For example, groups can be defined by features
that are unobserved e.g. due to personal privacy.
Ideally, we would like forecasters that are calibrated on
each individual sample. Our key insight is that individ-
ual calibration is possible when the probability forecaster
is itself randomized. Intuitively, a randomized forecaster
can output random probabilistic forecasts (e.g., quantiles)
— it is the predicted quantile that is randomly above or be-
low a fixed true value with the advertised probability (see
Figure 1). Randomization can remove systematic miscal-
ibration on any group of data samples. Useful forecasters
also need to be sharp — the predicted probability should
be concentrated around the true value. We design a con-
crete learning objective that enforces individual calibration.
Combined with an objective that enforces sharpness, such
as traditional log-likelihood, we can learn forecasters that
trade-off calibration and sharpness Pareto optimally. The
objective can be used to train any prediction model that
takes an additional random source as input, such as deep
neural networks.
We assess the benefit of forecasters trained with the new
objective on two applications: fairness and decision mak-
ing under uncertainty against adversaries. Calibration on
protected groups traditionally has been a definition for fair-
ness (Kleinberg et al., 2016). On a UCI crime prediction
task, we show that forecasters trained for individual cali-
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Figure 1: Example of deterministic forecaster that is calibrated on average (left) and randomized forecaster that is indi-
vidually calibrated (right). We plot the 80% credible interval the forecaster outputs, and shade the area where the true
function value is greater than the predicted median. Left: the deterministic forecaster outputs a fixed credible interval (the
left 2 plots are identical) and and can be miscalibrated on sub-groups of the data samples (e.g. it is not calibrated for the
shaded samples). Right: The randomized forecaster outputs a different credible interval each time (the right 2 plots are
different), and can remove systematic miscalibration on sub-groups of data samples.
bration achieve lower calibration error on protected groups
without knowing these groups in advance.
For decision making we consider the Bayesian decision
strategy — choosing actions that minimize expected loss
under the predicted probabilities. We prove strong upper
bounds on the decision loss when the probability forecaster
is calibrated on average or individually. However, when the
input data distribution changes, forecasters calibrated on
average lose their guarantee, while individually calibrated
forecasters are less affected. We support these results by
simulating a game between a bank and its customers. The
bank approves loans based on predicted credit risk, and
customers exploit any mistake of the bank, i.e. the distri-
bution of customers change adversarially for the bank. We
observe that the bank incurs lower loss when the credit risk
forecaster is trained for individually calibration.
2. Preliminary: Forecaster and Calibration
2.1. Notation
We use bold capital letters X,Y,Z,H to denote random
variables, lower case letters x, y, z, h to denote fixed val-
ues, and X ,Y,Z,H to denote the set of all possible values
they can take.
For a random variable Z on Z we will use FZ to denote
the distribution of Z, and denote this relationship as Z ∼
FZ. If Z is an interval in R we overload FZ to denote the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) Z → [0, 1] of Z.
X is a random variable on X , if S ⊂ X is a measurable set
and Pr[X ∈ S] > 0, we will use the notation XS as the
random variable distributed asX conditioned onX ∈ S.
Let Y be an interval in R, we use F(Y) denote the set of
all CDFs on Y . We use d : F([0, 1]) × F([0, 1]) → R
to denote a distance function between two CDFs on [0, 1].
For example, the Wasserstein-1 distance is defined for any
F,F′ ∈ F([0, 1]) as
dW1(F,F′) =
∫ 1
r=0
|F(r)− F′(r)|dr
This is the distance we will use throughout the paper. We
provide results for other distances in the appendix.
2.2. Problem Setup
Given an input feature vector x ∈ X we would like to pre-
dict a distribution on the label y ∈ Y . We consider regres-
sion problems where Y is an interval in R.
Suppose there is a true distribution FX on X , and a random
variable X ∼ FX. For each x ∈ X , we also assume there
is some true distribution FY|x on Y , and a random variable
Y ∼ FY|x. As a convention, the random variable Y only
appears in any expression along side x or X. Its distribu-
tion is always defined conditioned on x (or after we have
randomly sampled x ∼ FX).
A probability forecaster is a function h : X → F(Y) that
maps an input x ∈ X to a continuous CDF h[x] over Y .
Note that h[x] is a CDF, i.e. it is a function that takes in
y ∈ Y and returns a real number h[x](y) ∈ [0, 1]. We use
[·] to denote function evaluation for x and (·) for y.
Let H def= {h : X → F(Y)} be the set of possible proba-
bility forecasters. We consider randomized forecasters H
which is a random function taking values inH.
To clarify notation, H[X](Y),H[x](Y) and H[x](y) are
all random variables taking values in [0, 1], but they are
random variables on different sample spaces.
• H[X](Y) is a random variable on the sample space
H×X × Y — All ofH,X,Y are random.
• H[x](Y) is a random variable on the sample space
H× Y , while x is just a fixed value in X .
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Individual
calibration
(Definition 1)
Thm 2
=⇒
Adv group
calibration
(Definition 4)
=⇒
Group
calibration
(Definition 3)
=⇒
Average
calibration
(Definition 2)
R.V. that needs
to be uniform
H[x](Y) ∀x ∈ X H[XS ](Y)∀S ⊂ X
H[XSi ](Y)
i = 1, · · · , n H[X](Y)
Deterministic Not Achievable (Prop 1) Not achievable (Prop 4) Achievable (prior work) Achievable (prior work)
Randomized Achievable (Thm 1) Achievable (Thm 2) Achievable Achievable
Figure 2: Relationships between different notions of calibration, ordered from strongest (individual calibration) to the
weakest (average calibration).
• H[x](y) is a random variable on the sample space H,
while x, y are just fixed values in X × Y .
Similarly h[X](Y), h[x](Y) are also random variables tak-
ing values in [0, 1], while h[x](y) is just a number in [0, 1]
(there is no randomness). This difference will be crucial to
distinguishing different notions of calibration.
We use FH[X](Y),FH[x](Y) and FH[x](y), etc, to denote the
CDF of these [0, 1]-valued random variables. These are
in general different CDFs because the random variables
have different distributions (they are not even defined on
the same sample space).
If the H takes some fixed value in h ∈ H with probability
1, we call it a deterministic forecaster. Because determin-
istic forecasters are a subset of randomized forecasters, we
will useH to denote them as well.
2.3. Background: Perfect Probability Forecast
We consider several criteria that a good probability fore-
caster H (randomized or deterministic) should satisfy, and
whether they are achievable.
Given some input x ∈ X , an ideal forecaster should always
output the CDF of the true conditional distribution FY|x.
We call such a forecaster a “perfect forecaster”.
However, learning an (approximately) perfect forecaster
from training data is almost never possible. Usually each
x ∈ X appear at most once in the training set (e.g. it is
unlikely for the training set to contain identical images). It
would be almost impossible to infer the entire CDF FY |x
from a single sample y ∼ FY |x (Vovk et al., 2005) without
strong assumptions.
2.4. Individual Calibration
Because perfect probability forecasters are difficult to
learn, we relax our requirement, and look at which desir-
able property of a perfect forecaster to emulate.
We first observe that for some x, when the random variable
Y is truly drawn from a continuous CDF FY|x ∈ F(Y),
by the inverse CDF theorem, FY|x(Y) should be a random
variable with uniform distribution in [0, 1] — As a notation
reminder, FY|x is a fixed (CDF) function Y → [0, 1], Y is
a random variable taking values in Y . Therefore, FY|x(Y)
is a random variable taking values in [0, 1]. Also recall the
convention that whenever Y appears in an expression, its
distribution is always conditioned on x, i.e. Y ∼ FY|x.
If H is indeed a perfect forecaster, then ∀x ∈ X , H[x]
should always equal the true CDF: H[x] = FY|x. There-
fore H[x](Y) is a uniformly distributed random variable.
In other words, FH[x](Y) is the CDF function of a uniform
random variable. Conversely, we can require this property
for any good forecaster.
Formally, let d : F([0, 1]) × F([0, 1]) → R+ be any
distance function (such as the Wasserstein-1 distance) be-
tween CDFs over [0, 1]. For convenience we use FU to
denote the CDF of a uniform random variable in [0, 1]. We
can measure
errH(x)
def
= d(FH[x](Y),FU)
and if errH(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X , we say the forecasterH
satisfies individual calibration.
In practice individual calibration can only be achieved ap-
proximately, i.e. errH(x) ≈ 0 for most values of x ∈ X ,
which we formalize in the following definition.
Definition 1. A forecaster H is (, δ)-probably approxi-
mately individually calibrated (PAIC) (with respect to dis-
tance metric d) if
Pr [errH(X) ≤ ] ≥ 1− δ
This definition is intimately related to a standard defini-
tion of calibration for regression (Gneiting et al., 2007;
Kuleshov et al., 2018) which we restate slightly differently
Definition 2. A forecaster H is -approximately average
calibrated (with respect to distance metric d) if
d(FH[X](Y),FU) ≤ 
Note that d(FH[X](Y),FU) = 0 is equivalent to the original
definition of calibrated regression in (Kuleshov et al., 2018)
FH[X](Y)(c) = Pr[H[X](Y) ≤ c] = c = FU(c),∀c ∈ [0, 1]
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In words, under the ground truth distribution, y should be
below the c-th quantile of the predicted CDF exactly c per-
cent of the times. More generally, an -approximately aver-
age calibrated forecaster with respect to Wasserstein-1 dis-
tance also has  ECE (expected calibration error) — a met-
ric commonly used to measure calibration error (Guo et al.,
2017). For details see Appendix B.1.
Despite the similarity, individual calibration is actually
much stronger compared to average calibration (Figure 2).
Individual calibration requires H[x](Y) be uniformly dis-
tributed for every x. average calibration only require this
on average: H[X](Y) is uniformly distributed only if
X ∼ FX — it may not be uniformly distributed if X has
some other distribution. For example, if X can be parti-
tioned based on gender, the forecaster can be uncalibrated
whenX is restricted to a particular gender.
2.5. Group Calibration
To address the short-coming of average calibration in Def-
inition 2, a stronger notion of calibration has been pro-
posed (Kleinberg et al., 2016; Hébert-Johnson et al., 2017).
We choose in advance measurable subsets S1, · · · ,Sk ⊂ X
such that Pr[X ∈ Si] 6= 0,∀i ∈ [k] (for Hébert-Johnson
et al. (2017) these are sets that can be identified by a small
circuit from the input), and define the random variables
XS1 , · · · ,XSk (Recall that XSi is distributed by X con-
ditioned onX ∈ Si).
Definition 3 (Group Calibration). A forecaster H is -
approximately group calibrated w.r.t. distance metric d and
S1, · · · ,Sk ⊂ X if
∀i ∈ [k], d
(
FH[XSi ](Y),FU
)
≤ 
This can alleviate some of the shortcomings of average cali-
bration. However, the groups must be pre-specified or easy
to compute from the input features X. A much stronger
definition (Figure 2) is group calibration for any subset of
X that is sufficiently large.
Definition 4 (Adversarial Group Calibration). A forecaster
H is (, δ)-adversarial group calibrated (with respect to
distance metric d) if for ∀S ⊂ X such that Pr[X ∈ S] ≥ δ
we have
d
(
FH[XS ](Y),FU
) ≤  (1)
3. Impossibility Results for Deterministic
Forecasters
We first present results showing that individual calibration
and adversarial group calibration are impossible to verify
with a deterministic forecaster. Therefore, there is no gen-
eral method to train a classifier to achieve individual cali-
bration. This motivates the need for randomized forecast-
ers.
Given a finite dataset D = {(xi, yi)} and a determinis-
tic forecaster h : X → F(Y), suppose some verifier
T (D, h)→ {yes,no} aims to verify if h is (, δ)-PAIC. We
claim that no verifier can correctly decide it (unless  ≥ 1/4
or δ = 1 which means the calibration is trivially bad). This
proposition is for the Wasserstein-1 distance dW1. Exam-
ples of other distances are given in the Appendix C.1.
Proposition 1. For any distribution F on X × Y such that
FX assigns zero measure to individual points {x ∈ X}
sample D = {(x1, y1), · · · , (xn, yn)} i.i.d.∼ F. For any
deterministic forecaster h and any function T (D, h) →
{yes,no} such that
Pr
D∼F
[T (D, h) = yes] = κ > 0 ,
there exists a distribution F′ such that (a) h is not (, δ)-
PAIC w.r.t F′ for any  < 1/4 and δ < 1, and (b)
Pr
D∼F′
[T (D, h) = yes] ≥ κ
This additionally implies that no learning algorithm can
guarantee to produce an individually calibrated forecaster.
because otherwise the learning algorithm and its guarantee
can serve as a verifier. Proofs of the proposition and a sim-
ilar negative result for adversarial group calibration are in
Appendix C.1.
In light of these negative results, there are two options: one
can make additional assumptions about the true distribution
FXY, such as Lipschitzness. However, these assumptions
are usually hard to verify, and their usefulness diminishes
as the dimensionality of X increases. We propose an al-
ternative: in contrast to deterministic forecasters, there is a
sufficient condition for individual calibration for random-
ized forecasters. The sufficient condition is verifiable can
be conveniently converted into a training objective.
4. Individual Calibration with Randomized
Forecasting
4.1. Reparameterized Randomized Forecaster
We will consider randomized forecasters that are determin-
istic functions applied on the input feature vector x and
some fixed random seeds R. (For readers familiar with
variational Bayesian inference (Kingma & Welling, 2013),
this is reminiscent of the reparameterization trick.) Con-
cretely, we choose a deterministic function h¯ : X×[0, 1]→
F(Y), and let R ∼ FU. Define the randomized forecaster
H[x] as
H[x] = h¯[x,R] (2)
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In addition, we would like h¯[x, r] to be a monotonic func-
tion of r for all x. Any continuous function that is not
monotonic can be transformed into one by shuffling r.
4.2. Sufficient Condition for Individual Calibration
In this subsection, we introduce sufficient (but not nec-
essary) conditions of individual calibration for random-
ized forecasters defined in Eq. (2). First, recall that the
definition of individual calibration requires H[x](Y) :=
h¯[x,R](Y) to be a uniform distribution for most of x ∈ X
sampled from FX. This condition is hard to verify given
samples, because for each x in the training (or test) set,
we typically only observe a single corresponding label
y ∼ FY|x.
As an alternative, we propose to verify whether h¯[x,R](y)
is uniformly distributed (for the unique sample y). There-
fore we introduce a stronger but verifiable condition:
h¯[x,R](y) is uniformly distributed (3)
for most (random) choices of x, y under FXY .
The benefit is that the condition — h¯[x,R](y) is uniformly
distributed — can be written in an equivalent form when
h¯[x, r] is a monotonic function in r (proved in Theorem 1)
h¯[x, r](y) = r, ∀r ∈ [0, 1],
We formalize a relaxed version of this condition (allowing
for approximation errors) as follows:
Definition 5. A forecaster h¯ is (, δ)-monotonically prob-
ably approximately individually calibrated (mPAIC) if
Pr
[|h¯[X,R](Y)−R| ≥ ] ≤ δ
Note that even though we want to achieve h¯[x, r](y) =
r, ∀r, this does not mean that h¯ ignores the input x —
h¯[x, r](.) has the special form of a CDF, so h¯[x, r] must
output a CDF concentrated around the observed label y to
satisfy mPAIC.
The following theorem formalizes our previous intuition
that monotonic individual calibration (mPAIC) is obtained
by imposing additional restrictions on individual calibra-
tion (PAIC) — mPAIC is a sufficient condition for PAIC.
Theorem 1. If h¯ is (, δ)-mPAIC, then for any ′ > 
it is (′, δ(1 − )/(′ − ))-PAIC with respect to the 1-
Wasserstein distance.
Proof can be found in Appendix C.2. This theorem shows
that mPAIC implies PAIC (up to different constants , δ).
In particular, if a forecaster achieves mPAIC perfectly (i.e.
 = 0, δ = 0), it is also perfectly PAIC.
The benefit of Definition 5 is that it can be verified with a
finite number of validation samples, and is amenable to uni-
form convergence bounds, so that we can train it following
the standard empirical risk minimization framework.
Proposition 2. [Concentration] Let h¯ be any (, δ)-
mPAIC forecaster, and (x1, y1), · · · , (xn, yn) i.i.d.∼ FXY,
r1, · · · , rn i.i.d.∼ FU, then with probability 1− γ
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(|h¯[xi, ri](yi)− ri| ≥ ) ≤ δ +
√
− log γ
2n
4.3. Learning Calibrated Randomized Forecasters
Given training data (xi, yi)
i.i.d.∼ FXY we would like to learn
a forecaster that satisfy mPAIC. We propose a concrete set
of forecasters and a learning algorithm we will use in all of
our experiments.
We will model uncertainty with Gaussian distributions
{N (µ, σ2), µ ∈ R, σ ∈ R+}. We parameterize h¯ = h¯θ
as a deep neural network with parameters θ. The neural
networks takes in concatenation of x and r and outputs the
µ, σ that decides the returned CDF.
Inspired by Proposition 2, we optimize the mPAIC objec-
tive on the training data defined as 1
LPAIC(θ) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
|h¯θ[xi, ri](yi)− ri|
Practically, this objective enforces the calibration but does
not take into account the sharpness of the forecaster. For
example, a simple h¯ can be constructed that trivially out-
puts r (Appendix B.2). We would also like to minimize the
variance σ of the predicted Gaussian distribution. There-
fore we also regularize with the log likelihood (i.e. log
derivative of the CDF) objective which encourages the
sharpness of the prediction
LNLL(θ) = − 1
n
n∑
i=1
log
d
dy
h¯[xi, ri](yi)
Because we model uncertainty with Gaussian distributions,
the LNLL objective is equivalent to the standard squared er-
ror (MSE) objective typically used in regression (Myers &
Myers, 1990) literature. We use a hyper-parameter α to
trade-off between the two objectives:
Lα(θ) = (1− α)LPAIC(θ) + αLNLL(θ) (4)
In other words, when α ≈ 0 the objective is almost exclu-
sively PAIC, while when α = 1 we reduce to the standard
log likelihood maximization (i.e. MSE) objective.
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Figure 3: Sharpness (negative log likelihood and average standard deviation) vs. calibration error (on worst group and
worst interpretable group) on the UCI crime dataset for different values of α (recall that α is the coefficient to trade-off
LNLL and LPAIC, α = 1 corresponds to standard training with LNLL). Each dot represent the performance of a classifier
trained with some value of α. It can be seen that there is a trade-off: a smaller value of α (more weight on LPAIC and less
weight on LNLL) leads to better calibration and worse sharpness. Left 2: Calibration loss on the worst group that contain
20% of the test data. Right 2: Calibration loss on the worst interpretable group.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
size of group
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
ca
lib
ra
tio
n 
er
ro
r 
 fo
r t
he
 w
or
st
 g
ro
up =0.1
=1.0
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
size of group
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
ca
lib
ra
tio
n 
er
ro
r 
 fo
r t
he
 w
or
st
 g
ro
up =0.1
=1.0
Figure 4: Calibration error as a function of the worst group
size. The shaded region represents the one standard de-
viation error bar on random training/validation partitions.
A forecaster trained with the PAIC objective (α = 0.1)
has better calibration on adversarially chosen groups. Left:
Without recalibration. Right With post training recalibra-
tion. Post training recalibration improves average calibra-
tion (i.e. group size = 1.0) but does not improve adversarial
group calibration (group size < 1.0).
5. Application I: Fairness
Individual calibration provides guarantees on the perfor-
mance of a machine learning model on individual samples.
As we will show, this has numerous applications. We begin
discussing its use in settings where fairness is important.
5.1. From Individual Calibration to Group Calibration
In high-stakes applications of machine learning (e.g.,
healthcare and criminal justice), it is imperative that pre-
dictions are fair. Many definitions of fairness are possible
(see related work section), and calibration is a commonly
used one. For example, in a healthcare application we
would like to prevent a systematic overestimation or under-
estimation of a predicted risk for different socio-economic
groups (Pfohl et al., 2019). One natural requirement is that
predictions for every group are calibrated, that is, the true
1In practice we always sample a new ri for each training step.
value below the r% quantile exactly r% of the times.
If the protected groups are known at training time, we could
enforce group calibration as in Definition 3. However, it
can be difficult to specify which groups to protect a priori.
Some groups are also defined by features that are unob-
served e.g. due to personal privacy.
We propose to address the problem by requiring a stronger
notion of calibration, adversarial group calibration, where
any group of sufficiently large size needs to be protected.
Moreover, we can achieve this stronger notion of calibra-
tion because it is implied by individual calibration.
Theorem 2. If a forecaster is (, δ)-PAIC with respect to
distance metric Wp, then ∀δ′ ∈ [0, 1], δ′ > δ, it is ( +
δ/δ′, δ′)-adversarial group calibrated with respect toWp.
We prove a stronger version of this theorem in Ap-
pendix C.3. We know from theory that a forecaster trained
on the individual calibration objective Eq.(4) can achieve
good individual calibration (and thus group calibration) on
the training data. We will now experimentally verify that
the benefit generalizes to test data.
5.2. Experiments
Experiment Details. We use the UCI crime and communi-
ties dataset (Dua & Graff, 2017) and we predict the crime
rate based on features of the neighborhood (such as racial
composition). For training details and network architecture
see Appendix C.3. 2
Recalibration. Post training recalibration is a common
technique to improve calibration. For completeness we ad-
ditionally report all results when combined with recalibra-
tion by isotonic regression as in (Kuleshov et al., 2018).
Post training recalibration improves average calibration,
but as we show in the experiments, has limited effect on
2 https://github.com/ShengjiaZhao/Individual-Calibration
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individual or adversarial group calibration.
5.2.1. PERFORMANCE METRICS
1) Sharpness metrics: Sharpness measures whether the
predictionH[x] is concentrated around the ground truth la-
bel y. We will use two metrics: negative log likelihood on
the test data E
[− log h¯(X,R)(Y)], and expected standard
deviation of the predicted CDFs E
[√
Var[h¯(X,R)]
]
. Be-
cause forecaster outputs Gaussian distributions to represent
uncertainty, this is simply the average standard deviation σ
predicted by the forecaster.
2) Calibration metrics: we will measure the (, δ)-
adversarial group calibration (with 1-Wasserstein distance)
defined in Definition 4 and Eq.(1). In particular, we mea-
sure  as a function of δ — for a smaller group (smaller δ)
the  should be larger (worse calibration), and vice versa. A
better forecaster should have a smaller  for any given value
of δ. We show in Appendix B.1 that measuring  is iden-
tical to the commonly used ECE (Guo et al., 2017) metric
for miscalibration.
The worst adversarial group may be an uninterpretable set,
which is argurably less important than interpretable groups.
Therefore, we also measure group calibration with respect
to a set of known and interpretable groups. In particular,
for each input feature we compute its the median value in
the test data, and consider the groups that are above/below
the median. For example, if the input feature is income,
we considers the group with above median income, and the
group with below median income. We also consider the
intersection of any two groups.
5.2.2. RESULTS
The results are shown in Figure 3 and 4. We compare dif-
ferent values of α (with α ≈ 0 we learn with LPAIC, and
with α ≈ 1 we learn with LNLL).
The main observation is forecasters learned with smaller α
almost always achieve better group calibration (both adver-
sarial group and interpretable group) and worse sharpness
(log likelihood and variance of predicted distribution). This
shows a trade-off between calibration and sharpness. De-
pending on the application, a practitioner can adjust α and
find the appropriate trade-off, e.g. given some constraint
on fairness (maximum calibration error) achieve the best
sharpness (log likelihood).
We also observe that post training recalibration improves
average calibration (i.e. when the size of adversarial group
is 100% in Figure 4). However, we cannot expect recalibra-
tion to improve individual or adversarial group calibration
— we empirically confirm this in Figure 4.
In Table 1 in Appendix C.3 we also report the worst in-
terpretable groups that are miscalibrated. These do cor-
respond to groups that we might want to protect, such as
percent of immigrants, or racial composition.
6. Application II: Decision under Uncertainty
Machine learning predictions are often used to make deci-
sions. With good uncertainty quantification, the agent can
consider different plausible outcomes, and pick the best ac-
tion in expectation.
More formally, suppose there is a set of actions a ∈ A,
and some loss function l : X × Y × A → R. If we had a
perfect forecaster (i.e. H[x] = FY|x), then given input x,
Bayesian decision theory would suggest to take the action
that minimizes expected loss (Fishburn & Kochenberger,
1979) under the predicted probability.
lH(x)
def
= min
a
EY˜∼H[x][l(x, Y˜, a)] (5)
φH(x)
def
= arg min
a
EY˜∼H[x][l(x, Y˜, a)] (6)
However, perfect forecaster is almost never possible in
practice. Nevertheless, calibration provides some guaran-
tee on the decision rule in Eq.(6) for certain loss func-
tions. In particular, we consider loss functions l(x, ·, a)
that, for each x, a, are either monotonically non-increasing
or non-decreasing in y. We call these loss functions mono-
tonic. For example, if y represents stock prices and a ∈
{buy, sell}, then when a = buy, loss is decreasing in y;
when a = sell, loss is increasing in y.
In the following theorem (proof in Appendix C.4) we show
that the actual loss cannot exceed the expected loss in
Eq.(5) too often. This would be Markov’s inequality if
Eq.(5) takes expectation under the true distribution FY|x.
Interestingly the inequality is still true when the expecta-
tion is under the predicted distributionH[x] 6= FY|x.
Theorem 3. Suppose l : X × Y ×A → R is a monotonic
non-negative loss, let φH and lH be defined as in Eq.(6)
1. IfH is 0-average calibrated, then ∀k > 0
Pr[l(X,Y, φH(X)) ≥ klH(X)] ≤ 2/k
2. IfH is (0, 0)-PAIC, then ∀x ∈ X , k > 0
Pr[l(x,Y, φH(x)) ≥ klH(x)] ≤ 1/k
6.1. Case Study: Credit Prediction
Suppose customers of a financial institution are represented
with a feature vector x and a real-valued credit worthiness
score y ∈ Y . The bank has a financial product (e.g. credit
card or loan) with a minimum threshold y0 ∈ R for credit
worthiness. If a customer chooses to apply for the product,
Individual Calibration with Randomized Forecasting
0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
Utility vs. 
 random customer
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Ut
ilit
y 
vs
. 
 ra
tio
na
l c
us
to
m
er
10 1 100
0.05
0.10
0.15
Ex
pl
oi
ta
tiv
e 
cu
st
om
er
 p
ro
po
rti
on =0.10
=0.12
=0.15
=0.20
=0.40
=0.70
=1.00
Figure 5: Comparison between individual calibration (α ≈
0) and baseline (α = 1). Left: Each dot represents a ran-
dom roll-out for different values of α, where we plot the
bank’s average utility when the customers either decide to
apply randomly or rationally. Individually calibrated fore-
caster perform worse than baseline when the customers are
random, but better when customers are rational. Middle
Left: Proportion of exploitative customers (customers with
y < y0 but decide to apply). Random forecasters have less
systematic bias and discourages exploitative customers.
the bank observes x, and uses forecasterH to predict their
true credit worthiness y. There is a positive utility for say-
ing ’yes’ to a qualified customer, and a negative utility for
saying ’yes’ to a disqualified customer. More specifically,
the utility (negative loss) for the bank is
y ≥ y0 y < y0
’yes’ 1 -3
’no’ 0 0
Guarantees from Average Calibration: Suppose the
bank uses the Bayesian decision rule in Eq.(6). If H is
average calibrated, Theorem 3 would imply that when the
bank says ’yes’, at most 25% will be to unqualified cus-
tomers (when customers truly come from the distribution
FX). For details see Appendix A.3.
The Bayesian decision rule in Eq.(6) is fragile when H is
only average calibrated because the guarantee above is void
if the customers do not come from the distribution FX.
For example, suppose some unqualified customers know
that their credit scores are overestimated by the bank, then
these customers are more likely to apply. More concretely,
if only the customers who would be mistakenly approved
ended up applying, then the bank is guaranteed to lose (it
will suffer a loss of -3 for each customer).
Guarantees from Individual Calibration: If H is indi-
vidually calibrated (and hence also calibrated with respect
to any adversarial subgroup), the bank cannot be exploited
— no matter which subgroup of customers choose to apply,
the fraction of unqualified approvals is at most 25%.
6.1.1. SIMULATION
We perform simulations to verify that individual calibrated
forecasters are less exploitable and can achieve higher util-
ity in practice. We model the customers as rational agents
that predict their utility and exploit any mistake by the
bank. For detailed setup, see Appendix A.3.
The results are shown in Figure 5. We compare different
values of α ∈ [0.1, 1.0] (recall when α ≈ 0 we almost ex-
clusive optimize LPAIC, and when α = 1 we exclusively
optimize LNLL). We compare the average utility on ran-
dom customers (customers drawn from FXY) and rational
customers (Appendix A.3).
The main observations is that when customers are random,
individual calibrated forecasters perform worse because av-
erage calibration is already sufficient. On the other hand,
when the customers are rational, and try to exploit any
systematic bias with the decision maker, individually cal-
ibrated forecasters perform much better.
7. Related Work
Randomized Forecast: Randomized forecast has been
used in adversarial environments. In online learning where
the true label can be adversarial, randomized forecasters
can achieve low regret (Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi, 2006;
Shalev-Shwartz et al., 2012). In security games / Stackel-
berg games (Tsai et al., 2010; Trejo et al., 2015), defender
needs randomization to play against attackers. (Perdomo
et al., 2020) gives a theoretical characterization of predic-
tion in (possibly adversarial) environments when the loss
function is strongly convex.
Calibration: Definitions of average calibration first ap-
peared in the statistics literature (Brier, 1950; Murphy,
1973; Dawid, 1984; Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi, 2006). Re-
cently there has been a surge of interest in recalibrating
classifiers (Platt et al., 1999; Zadrozny & Elkan, 2001;
2002; Niculescu-Mizil & Caruana, 2005), especially deep
networks (Guo et al., 2017; Lakshminarayanan et al.,
2017). Average calibration in the regression setup has been
studied by (Gneiting et al., 2007; Kuleshov et al., 2018).
Group calibration for a small number of pre-specified
groups has been studied in (Kleinberg et al., 2016). Inter-
estingly (Hébert-Johnson et al., 2017; Kearns et al., 2017)
can achieve calibration for any group computable by a
small circuit, but is computationally difficult (likely no
polynomial time algorithm). (Kearns et al., 2019) proposes
a notion of individual calibration applicable when there are
many prediction tasks, and each individual draws multi-
ple prediction tasks. (Joseph et al., 2016) achieves a no-
tion similar to individual calibration for fairness, but needs
strong realizability assumptions that are difficult to verify.
Individual Calibration with Randomized Forecasting
(Liu et al., 2018) proves an upper bound on calibration error
for any group. However, it is unclear how to compute the
upper bound if the group labels are not provided.
Fairness: In addition to calibration (Kleinberg et al., 2016;
Hébert-Johnson et al., 2017; Kearns et al., 2017), other def-
initions of fairness include metric based fairness (Dwork
et al., 2012), equalized odds (Hardt et al., 2016), conterfac-
tual fairness (Kusner et al., 2017; Kilbertus et al., 2017),
and representation fairness (Zemel et al., 2013; Louizos
et al., 2015). The trade-off between these definitions are
discussed in (Pleiss et al., 2017; Kleinberg et al., 2016;
Friedler et al., 2016; Corbett-Davies et al., 2017).
8. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we explore using randomization to achieve
individual calibration for regression. We show that these
individually calibrated predictions are useful for fairness
or decision making under uncertainty. One future direction
is extending our results to classification. The challenge is
that there is no natural way to define a CDF for a discrete
random variables. Another open question is a good theo-
retical characterization of the trade-off between sharpness
and individual calibration.
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Figure 6: The same plot as Figure 3, but with recalibration by isotonic regression. The results are qualitatively the same
with and without recalibration.
No Recalibration With Recalibration
α = 0.1 population density (+) pct immigrant 8yr (-)
(PAIC) pct drug officer (-) vac house boarded (-)
α = 1.0 pct black (+) pct immigrant (+)
(NLL) pct < 3 bedroom (+) pct dense house (+)
Table 1: Least calibrated group for each setup. A + sign indicates this feature is above the median and a - sign indicates
the feature is below the median. These are indeed groups where fairness can be a consideration (e.g. immigrants, race or
economic condition).
A. Experiments Details and Additional Results
A.1. Fairness Experiment Details
We use the UCI crime and communities dataset (Dua & Graff, 2017) and we predict the crime rate based on features
about the neighborhood (such as racial composition). The prediction model is a fully connected deep network, where the
additional input r is concatenated into each hidden layer (except the last one). Other than this difference, all other setups
are standard — with dropout and early stopping on validation data to prevent over-fitting. For details please refer to the
code included with this paper.
During evaluation of calibration error for interpretable groups, we only consider groups with at least 150 samples to avoid
excessive estimation error.
A.2. Additional Plots and Comparisons for Fairness Experiments
In Figure 6 we plot the same experimental results in Figure 3, where the only difference is we apply post-training re-
calibration (Kuleshov et al., 2018). There is no qualitative difference between Figure 3 and Figure ?? because (average)
calibration does not improve calibration for the worst group.
A.3. Experiment Details for Credit Approval
Dataset We will use the "Give Me Some Credit" dataset on Kaggle. Because it is a binary classification dataset (credit
delinquency vs. no delinquency), we first train a classifier to predict the Bernoulli probability, and use the probability (plus
a small Gaussian noise) as the label. We synthesize a training set and a validation set, where the validation set is very
large to simulate a stream of non-repeating customers. We train the bank’s forecasterH on the training set, and apply it to
interacting with customers sampled from the validation set.
Customer Model The customer utility we use is
y ≥ y0 y < y0
’yes’ 0.2 1.0
’no’ -0.5 -0.5
We assume the customers knows their own credit worthiness y. Based on previous customers x, y and the actual utility from
playing the game, we learn a function ψ(x, y) → R by gradient descent to predict the customer’s utility. The prediction
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Figure 7: The experiment in Figure 5 without post training recalibration.
function ψ is also a fully connected deep neural network. Each new customer (xnew, ynew) ∼ FXY will only apply if
ψ(xnew, ynew) ≥ 0.
Decision Rule The “Bayesian” decision rule in Eq.(6) can be written as
φH(x) =
{
’yes’ H[x](y0) ≤ 1/4
’no’ otherwise (7)
Recalibration Since post training recalibration (Kuleshov et al., 2018; Malik et al., 2019) is usually beneficial, we will
report both results with and without recalibration by isotonic regression. The results with recalibration is in Figure 5 and
the results without recalibration is in Figure 7.
A.4. Additional Plots for Credit Approval
In Figure 7 we plot the results without post training recalibration. They are qualitatively similar to Figure 5. Post training
recalibration has little effect on calibration of the worst sub-group, and therefore do not improve performance in this
experiment.
B. Additional Theoretic Results
B.1. Relationship between PAIC and ECE
Given a forecasterH we can define expected calibration error (ECE) as
ECE(H) =
∫ 1
c=0
|Pr[H[X](Y) ≤ c]− c| dc
Proposition 3. ECE(H) = dW1(FH[X](Y),FU).
Intuitively, both dW1(FH[X](Y),FU) try to integrate the difference between the curve c 7→ Pr[H[X](Y) ≤ c] and the curve
c 7→ c. The difference is that they integrate the difference in different ways (similar to the difference between Riemann
and Lebesgue integral).
B.2. Trivial Construction of mPAIC forecaster
We construct a trivial forecaster that is always mPAIC. Let Φ be the standard Gaussian CDF, In particular for some c > 0,
choose
h¯[x, r](y) = Φ(y/c− Φ−1(r))
Then when c→∞, we have h¯[x, r](y) = Φ(Φ−1(r)) = r. In other words, for any , δ, h¯ is (, δ)-mPAIC for sufficiently
large c. However, this forecaster is certainly not useful in practice because it outputs a distribution with variance→∞.
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C. Proofs
C.1. Proofs for Section 3
Proposition 1. For any distribution F on X × Y such that FX assigns zero measure to individual points {x ∈ X} sample
D = {(x1, y1), · · · , (xn, yn)}i.i.d.∼ F. For any deterministic forecaster h and any function T (D, h)→ {yes,no} such that
Pr
D∼F
[T (D, h) = yes] = κ > 0 ,
there exists a distribution F′ such that (a) h is not (, δ)-PAIC w.r.t F′ for any  < 1/4 and δ < 1, and (b)
Pr
D∼F′
[T (D, h) = yes] ≥ κ
Proof of Proposition 1. Given a distribution F and forecaster h such that PrD∼F[T (D, h) = yes] = κ > 0, we will
construct an alternative distribution F′ by choosing some function g : X → Y (defined later), and define a new distribution
X′,Y′ ∼ F′g by: X′ ∼ FX andY′ | x is the delta distribution on g(x). Then by Definition 1, ∀x ∈ X
dW1(Fh[x](Y′),FU) ≥ 1/4 (8)
In words, the above expression is because for any distribution h[x] outputs, we can never rule out a possible ground truth
distribution (F′g) that is deterministic. Under a deterministic distribution FY′|x, it must be that Eq.(9) holds. (An alternative
construction can strengthen the theorem by choosing Y′ | x to be a distribution with sufficiently small non-zero variance.
It can become clear that Eq.(9) is not an artifact of our requirement that h must output a continuous CDF, but rather the the
variance of the ground truth distribution cannot be known).
What remains to show is that there must exist a g such that
Pr
D∼F′g
[T (D, h) = yes] ≥ κ
We will do this with the probabilistic method. For convenience we will represent the value ‘yes’ by 1 and the value ‘no’
by 0. We can use the notation
Pr
D∼F
[T (D, h) = yes] := ED∼F[T (D, h)]
Because FX assigns zero measure to individual points, for any finite set of x1, · · · , xn i.i.d.∼ FX, all the xi are distinct (i.e.
xi 6= xj ,∀i 6= j) almost surely. SupposeG is a random function on {g : X → Y} defined byG(x) ∼ FY|x, then random
variables D = {(x1, y1), · · · , (xn, yn)} defined by the following two sampling procedures are identically distributed (i.e.
in the sense that they belong to any measurable subset of (X × Y)n with the same probability)
x1, · · · , xn i.i.d.∼ FX, yi ∼ FY|xi
x1, · · · , xn i.i.d.∼ FX, g ∼ G, yi = g(xi)
In words, we could either 1. directly sample a dataset D from F, or 2. we could first sample a value g(x) ∼ FY|x for each
x, then sample x1, · · · , xn ∼ FX and directly evaluate y1 = g(x1), · · · , yn = g(xn).
Therefore any bounded random variable must have identical expectation under the probability law defined by the two
sampling procedures
κ = ED∼F[T (D, h)] = Eg∼GED∼F′g [T (D, h)]
But this must imply there exists g such that
ED∼F′g [T (D, h)] ≥ κ
because a random variable must be able to take a value that is at least its expectation
For any other divergence we can get similar results by replacing Eq.(9). For example, for total variation distance we have
dTV(Fh[x](Y′),FU) = 1 (9)
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Proposition 4. For any distribution F on X × Y such that FX assigns zero measure to individual points {x ∈ X} sample
D = {(x1, y1), · · · , (xn, yn)}i.i.d.∼ F. For any deterministic forecaster h and any function T (D, h)→ {yes,no} such that
Pr
D∼F
[T (D, h) = yes] = κ > 0 ,
then there exists a distribution F′, h is not (, δ)-adversarial group calibrated with respect to F′ for any  < 1/8 and
δ < 1/2, and
Pr
D∼F′
[T (D, h) = yes] ≥ κ
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof is almost identical to the proof of Proposition 1. We construct a g : X → Y such that
Pr
D∼F′
[T (D, h) = yes] ≥ κ
We can pick the subgroup S1,S2 ⊂ X defined by
S1 = {x, h[x](g(x)) ≥ 1/2},S2 = {x, h[x](g(x)) < 1/2}
Because S1 ∪ S2 = X , so at least one of S1,S2 must have probability measure at least 1/2 under FX . Without loss of
generality assume it’s S1. Then for X˜ = X | S1 we have h[X˜](g(x)) ≥ 1/2 almost surely, Fh[X˜](g(x))(r) = 0,∀r ∈
[0, 1/2], which implies
dW1(Fh[X˜](g(x)),FU) ≥ 1/8
Therefore h cannot be (1/8, 1/2)-adversarial group calibrated.
C.2. Proofs for Section 4.2
Theorem 1. If h¯ is (, δ)-mPAIC, then for any ′ >  it is (′, δ(1 − )/(′ − ))-PAIC with respect to the 1-Wasserstein
distance.
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose h¯ is not (′, δ′)-PAIC, denote the set
Sb = {x, y ∈ X × Y,
∫ 1
r=0
|h¯(x, r)(y)− r|dr ≥ ′}
and as the complement of Sb in X × Y . We know that whenever x, y ∈ Sb we have for any  < ′
Pr[|h¯(x,R)(y)−R| ≥ ] ≥ 
′ − 
1− 
Then PrXY [X,Y ∈ Sb] > δ′. We have
Pr[|h¯(X,R)(Y)−R| ≥ ]
= Pr[|h¯(X,R)(Y)−R| ≥  | X,Y ∈ Sb] Pr[X,Y ∈ Sb] + Pr[|h¯(X,R)(Y)−R| ≥  | X,Y ∈ Sb] Pr[X,Y ∈ Sb]
≥ 
′ − 
1−  δ
′
Therefore, h¯ is not (, 
′−
1− δ
′)-mPAIC. This is equivalent to the statement: suppose h¯ is (, δ)-mPAIC, then h¯ is (′, δ 1−′− )-
PAIC.
Proposition 2. [Concentration] Let h¯ be any (, δ)-mPAIC forecaster, and (x1, y1), · · · , (xn, yn)i.i.d.∼ FXY, r1, · · · , rn i.i.d.∼
FU, then with probability 1− γ
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(|h¯[xi, ri](yi)− ri| ≥ ) ≤ δ +
√
− log γ
2n
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Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the sequence of Bernoulli random variables bi = I(
∣∣h¯(xi, ri)(yi)− ri∣∣ ≥ ). Suppose
E[bi] = δ, then by Hoeffding inequality
Pr
[
1
n
∑
i
bi ≥ δ + 
]
≤ e−22n
Plugging in e−2
2T as γ we have  =
√
− log γ
2n
C.3. Proofs for Section 5
Theorem 2. If a forecaster is (, δ)-PAIC with respect to distance metricWp, then ∀δ′ ∈ [0, 1], δ′ > δ, it is (+ δ/δ′, δ′)-
adversarial group calibrated with respect toWp.
Proof of Theorem 2. Given a forecaster H if for some x, y we have dWp(FH[x](y),FU) <  then by definition of the
Wasserstein distance we have ∫ 1
r=0
|FH[x](y)(r)− r|p ≤ p
IfH is (, δ)-mPAIC with respect toWp. Consider a partition of X into two sets: Xg where ∀x ∈ Xg we have∫
r
∣∣FH[x](y)(r)− r∣∣p dr ≤ p
andXb where the above property fails. We know Pr[Xb] ≤ δ. In general for any x ∈ X , because FH[x](y) is a monotonically
increasing function of c bounded in [0, 1], we have∫
r
∣∣FH[x](y)(r)− r∣∣p dc ≤ ∫
r
rpdr =
1
p+ 1
Another useful identity we will use is
FH[X](Y)(r) = Pr[H[X][Y] ≤ r] = Ex∼FX [E[I(H[x][Y] ≤ r)]] = Ex∼FX [FH[x](Y)(r)] (10)
Combining the above results we have for any X˜ = X | S
dWp(FH[X˜](Y ),FU) =
(∫ 1
r=0
|FH[X˜](Y )(r)− r|pdr
)1/p
=
(∫ 1
r=0
∣∣Ex∼X˜ [FH[x](Y)(r)− r]∣∣p dr)1/p (Eq.10)
≤ Ex∼X˜
[(∫ 1
r=0
|FH[x](Y)(r)− r|pdr
)1/p]
(Jensen)
= Ex∼X˜
[(∫ 1
r=0
|FH[x](Y)(r)− r|pdr
)1/p
| x ∈ Xg
]
Pr[X˜ ∈ Xg]+
Ex∼X˜
[(∫ 1
r=0
|FH[x](Y)(r)− r|pdr
)1/p
| x ∈ Xb
]
Pr[X˜ ∈ Xb] (Conditional Expectation)
≤ Pr[X˜ ∈ Xg] + (p+ 1)−1/p Pr[X˜ ∈ Xb]
≤ δ
′ − δ
δ′
+ (p+ 1)−1/p
δ
δ′
( ≤ (p+ 1)−1/p)
If we don’t care about constants too much, we can further simplify above by

δ′ − δ
δ′
+ (p+ 1)−1/p
δ
δ′
≤ + δ/δ′
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C.4. Proofs for Section 6
Theorem 3. Suppose l : X × Y ×A → R is a monotonic non-negative loss, let φH and lH be defined as in Eq.(6)
1. IfH is 0-average calibrated, then ∀k > 0
Pr[l(X,Y, φH(X)) ≥ klH(X)] ≤ 2/k
2. IfH is (0, 0)-PAIC, then ∀x ∈ X , k > 0
Pr[l(x,Y, φH(x)) ≥ klH(x)] ≤ 1/k
Proof of Theorem 3. Choose any x ∈ X , h ∈ H and r ∈ (0, 1). For some action a assume l(x, ·, a) is monotonically
non-decreasing. We consider the situation where y < h[x]−1(1− r), or equivalently h[x](y) < 1− r, then
lh(x) =
∫
y′∈Y
l(x, y′, a)dh[x](y′) ≥
∫
y′≥y
l(x, y′, a)dh[x](y′) ≥ l(x, y, a)
∫
y′≥y
dh[x](y′) ≥ rl(x, y, a)
because the above is true for any a ∈ A, it must also be true for the action φh(x). On the other hand, assume l(x, ·, a) is
monotonically non-increasing, then by a similar argument we get whenever h[x](y) > r we have
lh(x) ≥ rl(x, y, a)
Consider the set Sr,Mr,M¯r ⊂ X × Y ×H, defined by
Sr = {x, y, h | lh(x) ≤ rl(x, y, a)}, Mr = {x, y, h | h[x](y) ≤ r}, M¯r = {x, y, h | h[x](y) ≥ 1− r}
The above results would imply Sr ⊂Mr ∪ Mˆr. But we know that
Pr[X,Y,H ∈ Sr] ≤ Pr[X,Y,H ∈Mr ∪ Mˆr] ≤ 2r
taking k = 1/r gives us the desired statement.
IfH is individually calibrated, then it is also adversarial group calibrated by Theorem 2. Define a function ζ : X ×H →
{0, 1} that represents whether l is monotonically non-decreasing or non-increasing in Y . Then
Pr[X,Y,H ∈ Sr]
≤ Pr[X,Y,H ∈Mr | ζ(X,H) = 0] Pr[ζ(X,H) = 0] + Pr[X,Y,H ∈Mr | ζ(X,H) = 1] Pr[ζ(X,H) = 1]
≤ r
C.5. Proofs for Appendix
Proposition 3. ECE(H) = dW1(FH[X](Y),FU).
Proof of Proposition 3. This proposition depends on the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Let φ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] be a monotonic differentiable function such that φ(0) = 0 and φ(1) = 1. Let ψ(x) = x,
then for any 1 ≤ s ≤ +∞ we have∫ 1
c=0
∣∣φ−1(c)− ψ(c)∣∣s dc = ∫ 1
r=0
|φ(r)− ψ(r)|s dr
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First observe that by the monotonicity of FH[X](Y) we have
Pr[H[X](Y) ≤ c] =
∫ 1
r=0
I(FH[X](Y) ≤ c)dr = FH[X](Y)−1(c)
We get
ECE(H) =
∫ 1
c=0
|Pr[H[X](Y) ≤ c]− c| dc =
∫ 1
c=0
∣∣FH[X](Y)−1(c)− c∣∣ dc
=
∫ 1
r=0
∣∣FH[X](Y)(r)− r∣∣ dr = dW1(FH[X](Y),FU)
Finally we prove Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let [a, b] be an interval where φ(x) − x does not change sign, and f(a) = a, f(b) = b. Without loss
of generality, assume it is positive. Then∫ b
x=a
|φ(x)− x|sdx−
∫ b
y=a
(f−1(y)− y)sdy =
∫ b
x=a
(φ(x)− x)sdx−
∫ b
x=a
(−x+ φ(x))sf ′(x)dx
=
∫ b
x=a
(φ(x)− x)s(f ′(x)− 1)dx = (φ(x)− x)
s+1
s+ 1
|ba = 0
Let 0 = a1 < a2 < · · · < an = 1 be a set of points where f(ai) = ai, and f does not change sign between [ai, ai+1].
Then we have ∫ 1
x=0
|φ(x)− x|sdx−
∫ 1
y=0
|f−1(y)− y|sdy
=
∑
i
(∫ ai+1
x=ai
|φ(x)− x|sdx−
∫ ai+1
y=ai
|f−1(y)− y|sdy
)
= 0
